So m any d ifferen t criteria are used to define the n a tu re o f econom ic policy th at w hen analysing th e m th e au th o r feels th a t h e is in th e m idst o f a th ick tropical ju n g le. H is objective is n ev erth e less to p re s e n t th em in a system atic and orderly fashion, prim arily in o rd er to h elp those ven tu rin g in to th e ju n g le for th e first time.
Introduction
"L a sc ia te ogni sp e ra n za , voi ch'entrate (D ante) Our purpose here is to try to reconstruct the contemporary discussion of the concept of economic policy. It is not our intention to present and systematize it in its entirety, which we know to be an impossible task. We believe it is possible, however, to iden tify the main lines of thought so that they can be analysed, which has, at least, the merit of showing the state of perplexity prevailing on the subject
We are entering a tropical forest: dark ness, trees and bushes covered with parasitic growths, choked with creepers, and no safe paths. It is exuberant, chaotic and unyield ing, this conceptual and epistemological jungle of political economics; economic theory; economic analysis; economic sci ence; economic policy; deductive and/or empirical and positive and/or normative science; economics (taxonomy or theory?), meta-theory; formal and/or dialectic logical method (what instrumental inference is valid?); economics reduced to economic policy; economics and economic policy as adjacent or overlapping territories, or as distant countries with different languages; ideology and/or science; economic policy as applied economics, as art or merely as policy; rational, scientific, empirical eco nomic policy; models of various types, and so forth.
Texts proliferate, authors overlap and libraries are bursting. As early as 1891, Keynes p ère -paraphrasing Voltaire's "ninety per cent of arguments are settled with a dictionary"-maintained that the question whether political economics can be considered a positive science, a norma tive science, an art, or a combination of all three, is, up to a point, merely a question of names and definitions,1 thus adopting a sceptical position well before the present terminological confusion came into being.
In our search for the way out we shall walk in circles and, losing our bearings, retrace our steps, covering swampy ground, stumbling over roots and hearing the under brush crackle under our hesitating feet We shall have to climb the tallest tree to discover our bearings. But which tree is the tallest? We entered the jungle prompted by the curiosity of the callow traveller and seduced by the beauty of the forest seen from a distance. Now that we are in it, we see the mould, humidity and darkness; what has become of that magnificent view?
Sticky things, deceptive slippery ground, buzzing and stinging insects -this is the jungle. Inexperienced, we do not know how to find food; famished, we take advantage of only a fraction of what it is offered. We have not been on a 'jungle survival course1: on the contrary, we were told that it was a pleasant pastoral wood.
The denizens of the forest -buzzing, soft, hairy, stinging creatures-bewilder, nauseate, frighten and disturb. We entered the jungle armed with Professor Samuelson's In tro d u ctio n to E con om ics and the goodwill of a boy scout camping in the shadow of Baden Powell. And here we are.
There is no sense in retreating or ad vancing. The tropical forest with its rapid process of regrowth removes all traces of our footprints. We walk in search of a clearing or better ground and renewed hope keeps up our spirits. Little by little and with great effort we shall gain experience as woodsmen and find better food; the dim light will sharpen our vision; the buzzing and biting will bother us less. Shades, smells and sounds will come to have some meaning for us.
It is quite possible that we shall find no way out of the forest, although there may be several. This possibility does not frighten us. If we can adapt to our new surroundings, we will have a system to guide us in the jungle -we will know how to survive. We will get our bearings and learn to see the wood in spite of the trees; and we shall always have the possibility of living off the land, and of perhaps some day finding a way out.
The effort to cover the debate on eco nomic policy concepts may lead to injustice being done to a particular text. Without attempting to shirk our responsibility, we lay the blame in part on the authors them selves who often take no pains to clarify their positions and are sometimes con fusingly eclectic, or even fail to state their views explicitly. In the outline attempted here the references to the authors are includ ed as a preliminary effort to illustrate 'mar ket* positions, rather than to situate the author in a specific position following an exhaustive appraisal.
We shall attempt to present a tentative classification of the various positions taken on the concept of economic policy, placing them in relation to a frame of reference to be provided by 'official economics', under stood here to mean the group of intellectual constructs designed to serve ideologically, as a panegyric or under the cloak of science, in defence of the sta tu s quo or to propose an internal m odu s o peran di to increase the system's efficiency. The limits of this cate gory are relatively undefined, since they even include proposals and demonstrations of the need foT perfecting the system, not to mention reformist positions of an appar ently radical character. Moreover, the excessively wide-ranging search for a m odus o p e ra n d i may lead some sections o f'official economics' to cease to be linked to a given system. Finally, as is well known, the posi tion of 'official economics' develops in line with the changes which occur in the course of the historical evolution of the system it serves.
The choice of 'official economics' as a guiding principle in organizing our attempt at an appraisal does not establish a clear, rigidly defined central corpus. 'Official economics', bedecked in its finery, is in fact fraught with many doubts. In order to freeze history as the promise of change, it is obliged to perform prodigious juggling acts, and has serious problems in reconciling its two commitments; apologetics are often incompatible with action; the Academy is a coveted ship and its crew fiercely competi tive; no system is homogeneous, its domi nant groups have their differences which are reflected in the content of 'conventional economics'. As history never stops, the realities and requirements of the system necessitate a periodic revision of the corpus o f 'official economics'.
'Official economics' is slow to keep up with those changes and resists the frequent revisions and adjustments. In desiring to arrest the march of history it collides with it, and this collision gives rise to tremors and earthquakes on official ground. The mere succession of names -political economy, economic science, economic theory and economic analysis-reveals in its semantic transpositions the constant mobility of 'of ficial economics'. These lexicological 'revolutions' reflect the way in which 'of ficial economics' is performing its dual func tion, and are highly significant as represent ing a change in the angle of approach to economic matters. (L ichtenberg) For the purposes of this section, Robbins furnishes a highly useful frame of reference for the classification of the economic policy concepts in vogue. In the third quarter of the nineteenth century 'official economics' was passing through a period of adjustment. Classical and neo-classical thought co-exis ted, the former in process of going into honourable retirement, and the latter win ning its academic palms. In 1875, Caimess, in The C h a ra cter and L o g ica l M eth o d o f P olitical E co n o m y, sug gested a demarcation of the object of eco nomics and its scientific programme of work, which retains something of the classical tradition; "What astronomy was to the phe nomena of celestial bodies, dynamics to phenomena of movement, chemistry to the phenomena of the functions of organic life, political economics was to the phenomena of wealth. It proposed laws according to which these phenomena co-exist and are interrelat ed; in other words, it set forth laws governing the phenomena of wealth."2 In 1874, Walras, in his E lém en ts d 'économ ie p o litiq u e p u re, formally presenting his system of general equilibrium, that synthesis of neo-classicism, says that 'pure economics is, in essen ce, the theory of the determination of prices in a hypothetical system of absolutely free competition'. Point and counterpoint: the search for laws governing the production and distribution of wealth, and the aseptic determination of the conditions of equi librium.
I R o b b in s: A P ro m ise o f E p iste m o lo g ic a l T ra n q u ility or a V acuum "N o th in g is m ore conducive to peace o f m in d than having no o pinion to express
Marshall, the master of partial equili brium, published P rin ciples o f E con om ics in 1890, In successive editions revised by the author this was to be, up to the beginning of the 1920s, the neo-classical bible. In the eighth edition (1920) he opens with the words: "Political Economy or Economics is a study of mankind in the ordinary business of life; it examines that part of individual and social action which is most closely connect ed with the attainment and with the use of the material requisites of wellbeing. Thus it is on the one side a study of wealth, and on the other, and more important side, a part of the study of man."3 Marshall's summary is strongly reminiscent of classicism.
Cassel's emphasis on the scarcity princi ple and his rejection of any theory of value appeared in 1918. He argued that the econo my is dominated by the principle of scarcity. Since the means for satisfying needs are scarce, needs should be limited and the fulfilment of demand should be reduced to the point where the existing means suffice to satisfy those needs. In an exchange econo my, therefore, the scarcity principle consists in the need to co-ordinate consumption with a scarce supply of goods. This is the task of price formation.4 Economics is a science concerned with measurable quantities and their mutual relations, and with conditions of equilibrium conceived in quantitative terms.
Thus, 'official economics' enters the twentieth century in three forms: economics as the activity of mankind which contributes to his material well being; economics domi nated by the universalizing and timeless principle of scarcity; and economics geared to research on the systems of forces in equilibrium.
Robbins combined these three ap proaches in a definition of economic science which he felt would give it definitive epistemological status: "Economics is the sci ence which studies human behaviour as a relationship between ends and scarce means."5 He considered that his definition of the field of study of economics solved the awkward problem, implicit in the contempo rary definitions of economics, of distinguish ing between actions which do and actions which do not contribute to material well being in the obscure and ill-defined field of 'wealth'.
According to Robbins, a question which could not be answered by existing contem porary classifying concepts that sought to distinguish between 'economic' and 'non economic' aspects was, "how are time and means divided between 'economic' and 'non-economic' activities?" This question always relates to welfare, and any answer would, in his view, place the universe of human action in the economic sphere.
This seemed to Robbins an inexorable conclusion at a time when neo-classical 'official economics' considered the problem of the utility of labour, rent, etc., as a central elem ent in determining equilibrium. Since, therefore, all human action may be studied by economics, there would be no particular field to be labelled as economic, but rather an economic aspect to be analysed in all human activity. Wealth, with the essential attribute of scarcity and the search for well being, always involves an interrelationship between ends and means. The nature of this interrelationship, and the conditions for it to be efficient, form the specific aspect and scientific goal of economics, Robbins sug gest a goal which he assumes is compatible with the desire for maximum rationality in all human action. Man always chooses the most efficient ends-means relationship, in dependently of time and space. Reflection on economic questions, in the field to which Robbins refers in particular, assigns to eco nomics the function of satisfying the demand for efficiency inherent in every human ac-5L. Robbins, A n Essay on the N ature and S ignifi cance o f E conom ic Science, 1932. tion. This 'demand', which must be satisfied by economic analysis, is based on the scarci ty of means.
The nucleus of economics, i.e., 'abstract scarcity', is at once useful and limited in relation to needs. The objective of establish ing the social laws of production and distri bution of wealth is a long way off.
We have chosen this rigorously empty Robbinsian definition on the grounds that it provides a meaningful framework for a long process of erosion and curtailment of the cognitive pretensions of political economy as a science.
The great classical thinkers carried out difficult theoretical gymnastics in order to construct theoretical systems explaining cap italism, shedding light on its structure and movement. The neo-classical liberal think ing of Nassau Senior and Marshall under mined and impoverished the classical cons truction, proposing that economics should be an instrument for discovering knowledge, and no longer for the sake of knowledge itself. Marginalism declined to reveal the laws of production and distribution of the system in order to construct models of partial and general equilibrium.
Inasmuch as history refused to adhere to the reality of its constructions, neo-classi cism proposed for its models a heuristical and axiological value: the formulation of a formal structure on the basis of assumptions regarding initial conditions, and the propo sal of behavioural axioms as a frame of reference. This erosion of the epistemologi cal field of political economy finds its highwater mark in Robbins. Not because at that time the process of erosion was reversed, but simply because Robbins' book appeared at a time when capitalism was facing its greatest crisis. When the disenchantment of neoclassicism was at its height, Robbins propos ed a formal and universal vacuum. A more perfect flight from reality cannot be ima gined.
We shall see in Part Two of this article that this process of erosion continues to eat away at economics, one school of which currently accepts a pre-scientific 'black box' of theoretical instruments, consoling itself with the 'predictive power' of its models. This is a strange fate for political econo my as an 'official science'. It is frequently admitted that the historical development of a science progresses in stages from fragmenta ry empirical regularity to partial construc tions, and lastly to a theory to explain a system or order of phenomena. Political Economy as an 'official science' was at its theoretical high-water mark at birth, after which it lost substance throughout two cen turies, at present being confined to the position of a 'tool box'. This is the sad story we come accross as we pass through the jungle of economic policy.
Neo-classicism, by the giddy slopes of the study of equilibrium, arrives with Rob bins at the universal and strictly formal. An economic aspect exists in all human activity. This aspect -this dimension-is what should be analysed. In the ends-means interrelationship lies the whole question of choice or option. Since man, and by exten sion society, is rational the choice should be an efficient one. The problem of each indivi dual and each society is to maximize a specific result, according to a given availabil ity of means. Napoleoni, commenting on Robbins, points out the necessary and suffi cient conditions for the use of the adjective 'economic': varied goals, a hierarchy of goals, limited means, and means with alter native uses.6
Choice is now considered the only unifying principle in economics. Robbins' definition of economics as the science of human action has a series of implications. First, economic analysis is completely neu tral as regards goals. Centred on an efficient 6C. N apoleon i, 11 Piinsiero Económ ica del '900'. co-ordination of means, it is positive (sweet illusion) in the sense that it is free of value judgements (introduced in the objectives), about which it gives no opinion, merely accepting them as given. Secondly, econo mic analysis is deductive. As regards theore tical research, it will deduce propositions on the basis of universal postulates accepted aprioristieally. The propositions deduced will necessarily be valid and have no empiri cal content. Thirdly, the technical contribu tion of economic analysis is clearly distin guished: technical knowledge bears out the ability of the means to attain the ends. Economics accepts this proof and assesses the means in terms of their scarcity in relation to the goals chosen.
The formalism and apriorism of Robbins were immediately called into question.
Seligman summarizes the criticism as follows: "The best that could be said about Robbins' methodological presentation was to point to it as a rigorous exercise in econo mic formalism but one which necessarily prevented the economist from talking about important problems. Choice became an abs tract act of behaviour: genuine judgement was impossible because no comment was allowed on how choice was conditioned. As Launcelot Hogben once remarked, rational judgem ent on choice would require far more knowledge than economists were willing to admit. Perhaps that was why they defined choice as choice. The outcome was so gene ral a formulation of economic science that equilibrium was simply a balance of forces. And economics became a peculiarly deprav ed kind of scholasticism, a 'barren dialectic of scarcity', utterly devoid of substantive content. In short, Robbins wanted to create an economics so precise in definition and shape, so formalistic, that its very claim to scientific status was threatened",7 Which did not prevent him from being elevated to the peerage.) Some clues to this mystery are furnished later in this article.
Morgenstem, in 1937, attacked Rob bins' position on the score of empirical content: the few authors who deny econo mics the character of an empirical science in an attempt to ascribe to it the higher value of an a p r io ñ science, are faced with an unen viable difficulty, since on the one hand they neither can nor wish to deny the progress of theory, while on the other hand they see in that progress a serious challenge to the validity of the inferences which refer to economic policy based on these so-called a p rio ri proposals. An a prio ri economic theo ry simply does not exist.8
The criticism of Robbins' formalism is summed up by Godelier: economics is no longer a particular area of social life; rather it is an aspect of all human activity with the condition that it contrives to 'economize' its means. All directed activity becomes, strictly speaking, economic, at least in essence. Therefore, none in fact remains economic, and Political Economy dissolves in a general theory of action in which there is nothing to distinguish it from theories of politics, religion, etc.ü Thus Robbins ends a long process of economic 'asepsis' initi ated in the second half of the nineteenth century, Robbins, however, did not confine him self to the strictly formal level. To consider economics as a deductive science construct ed in terms of universal a p rio ri postulates meant that the postulates were selected on the basis of common sense. As regards consumer theory he postulated the existence of preferences susceptible of being ranked in order of priority, explicitly dispensing with the support of any psychological theo ry; and as regards production theory, he admitted as common-sense postulates the existence of various factors of production and the law of diminishing returns. Even though it involved accepting these proposi tions solidly based on common sense and without axiological connotations, in accept ing these postulates -a consumer/producer dichotomy, preferences (indicating ends), a triad of factors of production and diminish ing returns (as means)-Robbins was essen tially operating with the neo-classical ideo logy.
Although his theory lacked content and was severely criticized by his neo-classical colleagues, a legion of Robbinsians existed, and still exists; and everything seems to indicate that it will continue to exist in the future. This is because, as stated by Lowe, "there is only one set of modal micro-goals or action directives which is compatible with the action patterns formulated by the Law of Supply and Demand" and "no concern with any final goals, be they prestige based on conspicuos consumption or preference for the s ta tu s qu o of provisioning, or with any other source of 'satisfaction', may modify these modal goals".10 What does this set consist of? Lowe explains that "the label under which these modal micro-goals appear (as a consensus of the classic and modem market theory) has undergone many changes -from the classical 'desire to better one's conditions' to 'profit motive', 'maximum principle', etc. We shall subsume this twOpronged action directive -maximization and minimization-under the concept of 'extremum principle' ".u Lowe shows that the 'extremum princi ple' is attractive because of its formalism and because it provides a basis for deter mining solutions (of course, other conditions also being necessary). The wide acceptance of the Robbinsian definition shows that, despite its obvious vulnerability, it fits like a glove all those who construct economic theory as a system of static equilibrium. Since it is formal and meets a logical necessi ty of many thinkers, to the extent that econo mics -like Pontius Pilate-washes its hands of ends, the Robbinsian formula ad mits of many contents and has everything (or nothing) to please all shades of opinion.
A chemically pure arch-liberal like Von Mises, who reduces economics to two com plementary sciences -praxeology, a science of human action, and catallactics, dealing with market situations-is an enthusiastic Robbinsian.
Von Mises says that the object of praxeo logy is to investigate the categories of human action. To apprehend mentally as many praxeological theorems as may exist, the interested party need only bear in mind the essence of human action. In order to under stand the theorems fully, no experiments are necessary. We should concentrate and re flect on the structure of human action. Like logics and mathematics, praxeological know ledge is within us; it does not come from outside. It is a mistake to think that there is a historical way of undertaking economic in vestigation or that purely theoretical econo mics exists. We have economics on the one hand and economic history on the other. The two disciplines should never be confused. Every economic theorem is valid and exact when the circumstances envisaged by it are present. Praxeology -and therefore econo mics-is a deductive discipline. Its logical origin stems from the basis from which its deductions are derived: the action cate gory.12 At the other extreme, Lange -a socialist at heart and a neo-classical in his thinkinghas also joined the Robbinsian Legion. Lan ge teaches us that man's economic activity is a conscious and intentional activity. Eco nomic stimuli determine the objectives of economic activity, and the reaction to those stimuli is the adoption of means to serve the attainment of those ends. Economic activity therefore consists in achieving clearly-de fined goals through the use of specific means,13 After stating that, in capitalism, microeco nomic rationality arose at the enterprise level, Lange establishes that in socialism such rationality extends to the whole social sphere. In this passage -where he states his ideological choice-he announces the pre dominance of the economic rationality prin ciple defined as follows: according to this principle, in order to attain a goal to a maximum degree it is necessary to act in such a way that a given expenditure on means produces a maximum degree of at tainment, or a given degree of attainment is achieved with a minimum of means.14 Since rationality has become the characteristic feature of many sectors of human activity, a problem has arisen, i.e., that of discovering the common denominator of all sectors of rational activity. This gave birth to the science of rational activity -praxeologywhich can also be defined as the logics of rational activity.15
Thus Robbins, as commander of the foreign legion flocking to the flag of formal ism, recruits and brings together troops acting with such different motivations; Von Mises and Lange marching together (a fasci nating spectacle).16
The formal attraction of the Robbinsian formula is combined with its powerful ap peal at the operational level: at first sight it permits the 'professionalization' of econom ic thought. Godelier states that formal theory finds its apodicticity demonstrated in the fruitful results of operational research, which has done so much to improve in recent years the practical instruments of economic management; however, operational research is not a branch of political economy, but rather a set of mathematical processes which make it possible to maximize or minimize the value of a function-goal. The most impor tant results of the rational management of an enterprise were obtained by economists, mathematicians or engineers who explored the possibilities of analysis offered by a certain number of old mathematical instru ments (infinitesimal calculus) or more recent ones (linear programming, non-linear pro gramming, game theory, etc.).17
The appeal of the 'operationalization' or 'professionalization' effected under the aegis of Robbinsian science is by no means inconsiderable. It permits the economist to don the cloak of a modest and responsible operator, wearing the badge of science; it affords him the sensation of being an en gineer; it enables him to escape Byzantine debates or their disturbing alternative, i.e., trying to grasp the whole picture ; it demarca tes a field of action. In exchange, he has to renounce his critical faculties. Many consid ered this a good bargain; many will certain ly regard it as such in the future. There will always be a market for Lord Robbins.
130. L ange, Political Econom y. 14 Ibid. 15 Ib id . 16L ange states in his book that he is not a m em ber of th e R obbinsian legion and also d en ies sharing any com m on ground w ith Von M ises.
i7M. G odelier, op. cit., pp. 23 and 24.
II T h e N aive Transposition o f the Robbinsian Formula " ...A n d a lth o u g h v e r ily S a in t J o h n sa w in h is v is io n s the s tra n g e st m o n s te rs , he n e v e r d re a m t o f a c re a tu re m ore h o rrib le th a n so m e o f h is g lo ssa rists...",
(Chesterton)*
The Robbinsian formula, whereby econo mics is centred on the rational (efficient) articulation of ends and means, reduces the critical dimension of political economy to an arid 'dialectics of scarcity'. The formal and the operational exert a powerful fascination -good business is attractive. Thinkers, like butterflies, flutter around its lure. Although they very quickly bum their wings -there is a trap in the supposedly neutral territory of means-this does not prevent the treache rous flame from constantly attracting new clouds of lepidopterous thinkers. The term "Economic Policy", in Silvio Bocchi's D izio n a rio d e E con om ia P olítica , is defined as that part of economic science which studies the forms and effects of State intervention in economic life for the purpose of attaining certain ends. According to this definition, therefore, economic policy (a) is not conceptually distinguished from econo mic science whose analytical methods and logical systems it uses; (b) studies the forms and effects of State intervention in economic life with a view to clarifying whether such intervention has been, or will be, suitable for attaining the goals which the State was or is attempting to achieve through it; (c) adopts such goals as the 'givens' of a problem on which it believes it should pronounce no moral, political or, in brief, extra-economic judgement. Thus conceived, economic poli cy, like economic science, is a science of theorems or a philosophy of the 'possible'. It consists, more precisely, of a set of uniform
facts or laws related to action by the State.18
It is not only the perusal of dictionary definitions that leads to intellectual harakiri, however. This is proposed in all serious ness in the textbook for the law and intro ductory economics courses used in French schools. Raymond Barre produced the fol lowing gem of thought in 1956; "On the basis of the definition, which we accept, that political economy is the science of adminis tering scarce resources within a human society, it is possible to determine the field or content of political economy. It comprises four series of operations 1:;: 2;;: 3;:: 4. The orientation of economic policy is a function of certain political or social goals. The economist, as such, is not expected to pro nounce an opinion on these goals. He must assume them as given and can then, with as much objectivity and indifference as if deal ing with a completely different subject, form judgements on the fit or lack of fit between a goal and an institution, and on the compati bility or incompatibility between the goal and the means to be used".19
Both these definitions simply transpose the Robbinsian formula to economic policy, which is action by the State, which as an agent, pursues ends and disposes of means. Like any agent, it aims or should aim at rationality; and thus it is or should be Castilla, 1956 Castilla, , p. 1353 . T he definition o f E conom ic Policy in th e D izio n a rio de E co n o m ia P o lític a , organized by C laudio N apoleoni, M ilán, ed, di C om unitá, 1956, is identical to Bocchi's definition. In Italy, w h ere th e C hair of Political Econom y has a longer trad itio n , this seem s to be th e official definition. G. di N ardi, L e z io n i d i E c o n o m ia P olítica, Bari, 1950 , also supports this definition.
10A. M archai and R. Barre, E c o n o m ie P o litiq u e, Paris, P resses U niversitaires d e France, 2nd edition, 1958, vol. I, pp. 31-32. interested in an efficient articulation of ends and means. That is what we are here for. We are specialists in efficiency in action. As modest operators we pronounce no opinion on the goals; but we do have a lot to say about how to attain them efficiently.
There is one small problem, and in order to pinpoint it let us hear what Torres, another Robbinsian, has to say: "We have seen that the nature of things has caused a horizontal split in public economic activity and has also created a division of labour which manifests itself in two clearly differentiated positions: the establishment of goals, which is the political sphere, and the discovery of means or measures to achieve them, which is the task of the economist. This split, however, has not led to the formation of two watertight compartments because, since one of them is the economic problem, there must at least be certain permeable areas of mutual influence between the compartments... The theory of public economic activity can be elaborated from many perspectives, but the most direct is to consider it as the most important aspect of economic co-ordination. In actual fact, the fundamental problems that need to be solv ed are problems of co-ordination: co-ordina tion of ends and co-ordination of means",20
Torres sensed -albeit obscurely-some thing which escaped both Bocchi and Barre. The State pursues ends and possesses means. The articulation of ends and means at the State level raise a problem of 'co-ordina tion' of ends and co-ordination' of means.
Robbins, as an old-style liberal, put for ward his definition having in mind the agents of neo-classical microeconomics: the consumer, the enterprise, the owner of the factors of production, etc. He did not think of efficient action by the State, since, for an oldschool liberal, the State is a necessary evil whose activity in the economic sphere should be reduced to a necessary minimum, although it plays a vital role as an institution M . T orres, T eo ñ a y Prática en la Política E conô m ica, M adrid, Aguilar, 1955, pp. 23-24. for enforcing the rules of the game.21 And what is the name of the game? The answer is the market, or the free play of market forces. In this game the State has a small -preferably a minimal-direct economic participation (its importance is institutional, as the executive arm of the legislator).
When the definition is naively transpos ed to the theory of economic policy, without what Professor Knight considers of funda mental importance -adequate ethics and sociology, in a broad sense-economics has little to say about policy; in other words, without the recommendation of a minimum degree of State intervention, the problem arises of co-ordinating ends and means.22
Professor Taylor, another Robbinsian, states in a revealing paragraph: "The econo mic theories and rules typical of fascist systems can hardly be of interest to econo mists as such, since they lack virtually all consistency or rationality from the economic point of view. The essential aims of fascist régimes are not economic -to ensure that the people's resources and productive ener gy should be utilized or applied as efficient ly as possible for the general satisfaction of all their ordinary needs-but rather non economic or extra-economic, political, mili tary and socio-cultural: to make the economy or system of all the activities or use of economic resources subsidiary to the State machine and those vague and variable goals striven for by the authorities in the name of the national will for power and greatness". Upon analysing Taylor, Knight and Rob bins, they are all found to agree on the following points:
a) The neo-classical microeconomic agents face an 'economic' problem: how to articulate ends and means ac cording to the 'extremum' principle; b) 'Theory', as a deduction of universal propositions which may be confirm ed on the basis of specific explana tory principles not given immediate ly, admits that those agents are ratio nal (in the sense of demanding ef ficiency), and economics can indi cate to the aforementioned microeconomic agents how to attain, under specific conditions, 'maximizing' po sitions with respect to whatever goals motivate them -the microeconomic agents can choose any goal; c) We can now anticipate the maximiza tion conditions for each and every one of the microeconomic agents: the well-known conditions of perfect competition; d) The State is an institution and not an economic agent; as an agent it would distort those conditions, and its sole basic goal should be to permit the free play of market forces. Therefore Robbins, if consulted by his enterprising legionnaires who take his defi nition and apply it to the theory of economic policy, would caution them as follows: "Be ware of the 'co-ordination' of State action, for the State is not an agent. I do not countenan ce this transposition: my theory is valid only for rational agents, i.e., micro-agents, and not for a macro-agent, i.e., the State, which besides being potentially irrational would invalidate microeconomic rationality through its excessive weight". I am afraid, however, that many of his followers did not consult him. The reader will, have to exercise a little pa tience, since we shall revert to this point later.
For the time being we shall focus atten tion on other problems underlying the spread of the Robbinsian 'innovation' and its naive transposition, keeping as a reference the definitions of Bocchi and Barre.
In the first place, there is noticeable emphasis on the political-technical division of labour. The political level administers power and establishes the goals. The eco nomist, with his specialized scientific know ledge of 'economizing' means, fulfils the neutral and objective function of indicating the relative 'economicity' of the available means. The politician, if rational, will take the specialist's advice and choose the best possible means. The technical level thus provides a rational, scientific foundation for the articulation of ends and means, the glory and onus of decision-making falling on the politician. The economist preserves a scien tific neutrality and, like Pontius Pilate, does not sully his hands. Science remains pure and inviolate. Meynaud expresses the point to perfection: "The establishment of goals of government activity is a complex task. Is the economist equipped to play a part in this process? Some might argue that economics should guide government action and try to produce evidence of this. However, by taking positions, the technical expert com promises his discipline in the eyes of public opinion and of governing circles. He runs the risk of discrediting it through errors and questionable assertions; in any case, he makes it controversial. Therefore, the econo mist has a definite interest in defining the limits within which, in his individual per formance, he can legitimately invoke scien ce or, in other words, the mantle of science".24
Here is a morality of considerable ap peal: the doctrine of a separation between ends and means, of a divorce between M eynaud, L 'E laboration de la Politique Eco nom ique, science and technology on the one hand and the formulation of goals and values on the other. Baran says that to abstain from trans position is a moral principle which disarms the intellectual as a social critic.25 The establishment will award its seal of approval to a well-behaved intellectual; the intellec tual, free from uncomfortable reflections on the rationality of everything, eases his conscience as an operator within the system concerned only with the efficiency of the segment in which he operates. He is aligned with science which, like the vestal virgins of yore, permits him to do anything requested of him without becoming sullied. Snow, quoted by Baran, observes that those who wish to save themselves say: we produced the tools, and there we stop. It is up to you others, the rest of the world, the politicians, to say how those tools should be used. They can be employed for purposes which most of us consider are wrong. If so, we regret it; but as scientists it does not concern us.26 I cannot help calling to mind the image of the German "maximizer" who in 1942, bent over his work table, sought to minimize the number of wagons/day used in a certain operation to transport Jews to Treblinka. That night he overcame any hesitation he might have felt -I am a technician and as such 'neutral and objective'-and slept peacefully because the vestal would watch over his sleep; the maximization of partial rationality and the maximization of global irrationality combined.
This ethics is combined with analytical lobotomy. By demarcating an area for reflec tion, carefully and judiciously isolated from the other areas of human activity, the econo mist, and economic analysis, remains blind to history, to change, to the whole of which he is a part.
Baran again shows why this lobotomy is painless. "The intellectual worker in our P . Baran, "A m issão do in telectu al" , M onthly R eview , F eb ru ary 1961.
26P. Baran, " E l com prom iso d el in telectu al" , Tri m estre E conóm ico, vol. 28, N.° 112, p. 654, societies, obliged to avoid being identified as a manual worker, tends to ascribe a real existence to his own position; to exaggerate the difficulty of his work and the complexity of the skill required to perform it; to exagge rate the importance of his formal education and academic degrees. He is not concerned with the relationship existing between the segment of human performance, within which he operates and the other segments, nor between them and history as a whole. His natural motto is to 'mind his own busi ness'. Accustomed to think in terms of ability, experience and skill, the intellectual worker considers that the study of the rela tionship between the problems themselves and the whole is one of many specialties. For him, this is the domain or field of action of philosophers, members of the clergy or politicians, just as questions of culture or values are the business of poets, artists and scholars."27
This proposed political-technical divi sion of labour is directly based on the idea of neutrality of means; on the idea that the political option assumes responsibility for the arbitration of conflict in economic policy processes: the choice of goals. It admits that the choice of a goal involves an arbitration absolutely or relatively favourable to some, and unfavourable to others. Once the goal is established, however, it assumes the exis tence of consensus regarding the desirability of maximum efficiency in its attainment. As the technician is a specialist in means, he will therefore act at a non-conflictive level. This assumption is extremely hazardous.
Without going any further into the mat ter, we should keep in mind that the choice of a goal is merely a declaration of intent, since the choice and actual implementation of the means is what provides a foundation for the goal (although not necessarily). De clarations of intent are normally vague or formulated in such broad terms as to obtain maximum consensus.2tt Actually, the specific For the State's action at the level of economic policy, the naive transposition of the Robbinsian ends-means binomial is a source of great confusion. From the microeconomic standpoint the neo-classical agent has an objective (end) and resources (means). For example, the consumer sup posedly aims at maximizing satisfaction (end) and possesses means (income and previously accumulated assets). When the Robbinsian formula is naively transposed to State action, the ends-means binomial con tributes to considerable semantic confusion. The State's goals are not microeconomic; they relate to the functioning of the econom ic system as a whole, and to the desirability of obtaining results from the interaction of complex individual performances. A com ponent of that overall performance is the direct executive responsibility of the State, another must be the result of the perform ance of other social entities induced and/or compelled by measures enforced by the m ere declarations of intent. Political parties are largely resp o n sib le for this confusion, since their desire to attract th e m axim um n u m b er of votes leads them to seek fairly vague form ulas to avoid displeasing anyone, i.e., m ere slogans such as, general prosperity, social ju stic e (slow ing dow n inflation; stepping up econom ic an d social d evelopm ent, etc.)." M eynaud, L 'E la b o ratio n d e la P o litiq u e E co n o m iq u e , op. c it., p. 129.
29 "T h e p o litician confínes his attention, w ith satisfaction, to titles o f chapters (of th e politico-eco nom ic process) or to m inor details o f electoral im por tance. T h e specialist is clearly in a b etter position to give th e p o litician 's preferences an operational co n te n t. State to contribute by their performance to the desired results. This means that for economic policy purposes the State's per formance is a means, just as the performan ces of other social entities are also means.
Accepting without argument, for the moment, the idea that the State is the subject-entity of economic policy, and the other social actors its object-entities, it is easy to locate the source of the confusion. The use of the ends-means binomial can only be used in the case of an isolated entity. The State, seen as an isolated entity, could have a Robbinsian goal -for example, to minimize the fiscal expenditure (means) for a specific level of public services provided (end). When we talk about maximizing the material welfare of society, however, we are not talking about an end in the Robbinsian sense. We are talking rather about a vague politico-economic objective which is broken down into a network of sub-objectives in the attainment of which the perfor mance of the State and of all the other entities of the economic and social system converge.
The State's direct performance, and its inductive, directive and coercive action on other social entities, contribute to the attain ment of the vague global objective through out the whole network of sub-objectives. The means available for this are its economic policy instruments. And these instruments are not the means of the Robbinsian formula.
Simple transposition does not demonstrate that (less illegitimately and in the best of hypotheses) the term "means" is applicable only to the behaviour of the State and other social entities, while the term "end" is applied to a desired "performance" for the system as a whole.
Economic policy instruments are not Robbinsian means. For Robbins, as a good neo-classicist, the means available to the micro-agents (consumers, enterprises, own ers of factors of production, etc.) are the "legitimate property" of those who own them and obtained them through the free play of market forces, past and present. The instruments at the State's disposal are means with which the institution has been endow ed. The State's possession of them does not stem from the play of market forces: it is the product of a complex and conflictive social process through which th.e State, institution of institutions, has been 'fitted out' in the course of history. It is the result of a specific scheme of social organization. The composi tion of the set of economic policy instru ments, the form in which they operate, the limits of their application, are a matter of controversy and are inherently the essential ly impermanent result of political and social processes.
In sum, when transposed to economic policy, the use of the ends-means binomial, which for Robbins had a very precise mean ing, becomes very vague and causes a con fusion whose bibliographical consequences are tremendous. Pages and pages and yet more pages reflect the efforts of the naive Robbinsians to find a way out of this termino logical trap. Often they run up against the hoary problem of causality, the chicken or the egg: means as ends, ends as means. We believe that the use of the term objectiveinstrument would obviate the need to peruse all those pages of enormous yet sterile efforts. The economic policy objec tives would be all the achievements which it is sought to obtain for the economic system as a whole susceptible of being broken down into a network of sub-objectives. Economic policy instruments would be the expe dients which the State has at its disposal to carry out direct action or induce, direct or coerce the other social entities to act in accordance with its selected sub-objectives. There is, however, a tendency to retain the ends-means binomial and a refusal (in eco nomic policy textbooks) to use the objectiveinstrument binomial. Why this preference for confused terminology? (Inertia of the vernacular, perhaps!) For some, tradition is doubtless comfortable, but we believe that there is an underlying reason. The endsmeans binomial makes it easier to sell subliminally the idea of the inherent legiti macy, as demonstrated by economics, of cer tain ends and certain means; above all, of certain means (instruments). The liberal point of view supports the scientific legiti macy of a specific set of instruments, and primarily of instruments of action by induce m ent rather than direct, directive and co ercive instruments. In addition, it tends to attribute greater legitimacy to means whose application is not personalized or capable of being personalized. Hence monetary and fiscal instruments always appear to be the most legitimate. The concept of instrument has the defect of showing too clearly the conventional and operational nature of the expedients in the State's power. It is useful for the operational dimension of 'official economic science' , but somewhat disturb ing for its apologists.
The legitimacy ideologically granted by 'official economics' to monetary and fiscal instruments (the only ones to deserve spe cialized courses in monetary and fiscal poli cy in economics curricula), and the academic prejudices and distrust regarding the instru ments of action by directon or coercion, not to mention the direct action of the public sector (I have never heard of a course on policy of State enterprises) are based on the age-old tenet of liberal ethics which distin guishes between liberty (authorized)) and licence or arbitrariness (condemned). Locke, in T w o T reatises o f G overn m en t written in the second half of the 17th centu ry, argued that liberty means only not being subjected to any power other than that established by social consensus; it means being subject to laws which are not imposed from above; it means not being subject to the arbitrary, changing, unknown, uncertain and discretionary will of others oi; of the State. If handled in accordance with the rules of the game as fixed by consensus, the instruments of action by inducement which neither are nor can be personalized allow the microeco nomic agents to act freely in the sense which Locke attributes to the term whereas the other instruments (direct, directive or co ercive, or of both types) subject people to the 'arbitrariness' of the State, thus limiting their liberty and restricting 'free enterprise'.
What is striking about authors such as those quoted above is their unbounded trust in the models constructed by economic analysis as concerns their representativity of the functioning of part or 'the totality' of the economic system. Through the identi fication as an end (to be chosen politically) of a dependent variable of the model, the economist can indicate the most efficient means (independent variables of the model, under State control). "An economic model consists simply of a group or set of economic relationships, each one of which involves at least one variable which also appears in at least one other relation which is part of the model" .30 The economic relations of the model may be: (a) behavioural, reflecting the proposed theoretical articulation of the eco nomic variables; (b) institutional restrictions, reflecting the institutional framework; (c) tech nical, reflecting the technological framework; and (d) identities or tautological definitions.
In order to admit solution, the theoreti cal model must satisfy a number of mathema tical requirements, among which the most general is that the number of relations (equations) should at least be equal to the number of variables (unknowns). Trans ferred to economic policy under the naive approach, this model becomes or can be come the decision model. According to its 'inventor', Nobel prize winner Ragnar Frisch, the decision model arises in the following manner: the work of economic policy consists in considering that the data, which include economic policy means, are known, and that economic phenomena and the variables which include the ends of economic policy are the unknowns. The problem of economic policy is to consider the ends as given and the means as unknown or, at least, partially as unknowns 31 A deci sion model does not have to meet thê A c k le y G ardner, M acroeconom ic theory, New York, M acm illan, 1961, p. 12.
31Ragnar Frisch, "T h e R esponsibility of the condition to admitting a solution as men tioned above. If a number of equations of model m is less than that of the variables n, once n-m variables, known as the model's degrees of liberty, may be controlled at the State's will, the model admits solution.
(What pleasure the economist feels when handling a model with n-m degrees of liberty!) A digression: one type of analysis found in the works of economists conjures up in my mind the image of the Byzantine scholars arguing heatedly over the sex of angels. The example may be given of the nature of the logical content of explanatory (in eco nomic analysis) and normative (in economic policy) decision models. The heart of the mat ter: is the logic the same, or perhaps different?
Here are two opposing scholars in the heat of the argument. Koopmans asserts their identity: "The distinction between descriptive and normative applications is extraneous to the model. Whether a state m ent derived from the postulates of the model is used descriptively or normatively depends not on the logical content of the statement but on the extent to which the choices with which the model deals are regarded as subject to the influence of the user of the analysis" .32 "The same chains of reasoning may serve in explanatory as well as in normative economic theory."33
On the other side of this thrilling argu ment we find Hans Jurgen Seraphim: " ...the job of economic theory is to discover the conditions of socio-economic phenomena, i.e., to devote itself to the investigation of causes... This causal approach -we call it economic theory-is characterized by the fact that something specific, irrespective of how its content is conceived, becomes the E co n o m etrician " , in E conom étrica, January 1946. T in b erg e r, an o th er N obel prize w inner, in Econom ic Policy, P rinciples andD esign, N orth-H olland 1956, p. 9, converts F risch 's decision m odel into a pillar of his m onum ent. Science, N ew York, M cGraw-Hill, 1957, p. 64. 33Ib id ., p. 144.
32T. C. Koopmans, Three Essays on the S tate o f E co n o m ic
object of the enquiry. This datum is our epistemological object... This approach, which starts from the given and inquires into ...its modalities, in our interpretation, and in the broader sense of the word, is a causal theoretical approach. Now, economic policy adopts a teleological approach as proposed by Englis: ...'the teleological approach, which methodologically we describe as economico-political in the formal sense, can never be an inversion of causal theory, but is rather a rational way of seeing in its own right...'.34 Thus science situates itself in the way of thinking of the acting subject who ponders all possible interventions in the external causal world, from which he chooses one. Science wishes to understand this choice; it wishes to understand why the subject desires one intervention and not others, and why he considers it most useful. This gives rise to an order of proposed content in thought; ends are the ordering elements, means the ordered. The idea of the proposed end becomes the cause of the act. From this it may be deduced that the teleological study of an experimental subject calls lor a logical construction of the know ledge specific to it, i.e., distinct from the specificity of the causal study. The differ ence in the form of causal and teleological knowledge consists in the fact that the former considers that the content of know ledge simply exists whereas the latter con siders that the content is proposed. Econom ic policy consists in a set of postulates ordered according to the ends-means prin ciple and uniformly dominated by a common original finality".35 This gripping discussion has us on the edge of our seats. However, returning to the question of the trust which the naive think ers on economic policy of the Robbinsian ,34Karel E nglis, Teleologische Theorie D er S ta a tsw ir tsc h a ft, q u o ted by H. J. Seraphim in Política econom ica gen era l, taken from th e Spanish translation by G u illerm o G. Arnold, E l A teneo, Buenos Aires, 1961, passim , p. 3. 35H, J. S eraphim , Política económ ica general, op. cit., pp. 2 to 4. Professor Seraphim lectures in the tradition place in models, we have nothing to say about the representativity of models, except to point out that some authors in the Robbinsian school also take the ideological step mentioned earlier.
When they become aware of the "Torres problem",36 they may defend the transposi tion of the Robbinsian formula on condition that they introduce into their economic policy approach the neo-classical position on the restriction of State action (basically limited to maintaining the rules of the game). It is true that in this case the innova tion barely amounts to a neologism. We are by no means against innovation in language, recognizing as we do the need to revitalize the old images. In the present study, authors following this line are considered neo liberals. It is important to point out that many other authors inadvertently change the sense of the Robbinsian formula by remov ing the limitations. These end up either in the confusion demonstrated by Taylor or, attempting to expand the Robbinsian formula, in Torres' trouble-ridden 'co-ordination'.
Otherwise, they drop the formula of indifference to ends and, through scientific procedures, proceed to investigate those which should guide State action on the economy as a whole. Finally, it should be noted that the neoliberal formula is ambigu ous, since it combines authors of the Rob binsian school and welfare economists. Furthermore, the prefix itself is question able since in many cases the only 'neo' aspect of it is the formalization they adopt. We shall draw attention to a number of points at a later stage, as the variants arise.
Meanwhile, before continuing to push our way through the tropical jungle, a com ment should be made on the naivety of the chemically pure neoliberal position and its moving trust in economic policy models U niversity o f M unster an d his book dates from 1955; th e S panish translation was adopted as th e basic textbook in p olitical econom y by Buenos Aires U niversity in the 1960s. Here is what Professor Steiner had to say when revealing his discovery: "Without the generous use of abstractions and broad generalization, it is inevitable that one would get lost in the bewildering jungle of concrete facts about public economic poli cies. But every effort is made in this study to support abstractions with relevant concrete facts to prevent their becoming meaningless. Abstractions are useful tools by which com plex details can become related. The mere fact that abstractions are supposed to accom plish this useful classification means that they must be based up on concrete reality. But, when one comes to reality in the realm of public economic policy he finds it distres singly complex. As Orton pointed out, the closer we come to reality, the more we must recognize that we are dealing with innumer able streams of tendency, running parallel, blending, conflicting, clashing violently; coming from origins we cannot always trace; and never lying wholly on the surface."38 37P rofessor S tein er was D irector o f th e Policy D e v e lo p m e n t Staff of th e D efense Production Ad m inistration. The situation encountered by Professor Steiner is truly horrifying -and we would add that the interrelation he makes between abstraction and reality is likewise 'horrifying'.
■^G. A. S teiner, G o vern m en t's Role in Econom ic
In my opinion, and this is my explana tion, our neoliberals do well to cling to their naivety and stick to the mountain tops.
It is also worth recalling here the inter esting position taken by Seraphin: "We are interested in economic policy purely as a science. We do not move in the world of the political militant. Our work lies not in the field of personal acts and decisions of a political nature but in the furthering of knowledge, where opinions are subjective and ideologies and idiosyncrasies must be eliminated as far as possible; this is essen tial, or at least they must be situated on a prescientific plane. Ourprocedure must be such that the results we obtain are valid in the sense that any person who accepts the prior conditions from which we started must arrive at the same results. But those condi tions must not be chosen arbitrarily. It must be possible to corroborate the fact that they were rationally proposed" .39 (Aristotle and Kant cry "hear, hear!" in the wings.)
Let us see where Seraphim is heading: "Only a theory of models which utterly rejects practical application and which, being hypothetical in nature, neither openly nor clandestinely, neither deliberately nor involuntarily, neither directly nor indirectly serves as a basis for judgements about the real economy, can stand aloof from the conflict of value judgements";40 and he goes on: "If the scientist abstained from personal value judgements, i.e., if he incorporated in his theoretical models the relevant decisions taken by politicians as initial data with equal status and value, this would mean that de f a c to he would be basing himself on the momentarily valid dominant ideology. In so from his book The E conom ic Role o f the State, U niversi ty o f C hicago Press, Chicago, 1950, pp. 15-16. 39H. J. Seraphim , Política económ ica general, op. cit., p. 1.
™ lhid., p. 49.
doing he would lower himself by becoming the propagandist for currents of political will; and sooner or later he would justly be despised, and thus achieve precisely the opposite of what he wanted to obtain by rejecting an independent position with re gard to value judgements."41 The economic policy expert has only one option: to shut him self up in an ivory tower surrounded by a sanitary cordon. The theory of economic policy produced in such conditions would be grounded in reason and above suspicion u rb i e t orbi, in view of the austerity of our scientific stylite, who would thus vanquish the barbarism of ideology and politics. And now a final comment on our 'neoli berals'. What is the State in their ideas on economic policy? The answer is an entity as abstract as the other subjects (consumers, enterprises, etc.); it has ends, it is rational, and it seeks economy of means. Our neolib erals do not bother themselves very much with the specificity of this subject, and in this respect they differ greatly from the econo mists of the English Classical school. Neoclassicism derived its aseptic concept from the ideal State cherished by the English Classical economists. Robbins states in a work from his mature period: "By the theory of economic policy I mean the general body of principles of governmental action or inac tion -the agen da or non-agenda of the State as Bentham called them-in regard to economic activity".42 This State had at least some of the substance proposed by English utilitarianism. It was not the abstract ghost of the politico-economic transpositions de rived from the young Robbins by an illadvised neo-classicism. Bresciani-Turroni says of this ghost: "Society and State are only abstractions -in reality, there are only individuals with their needs, efforts, pas sions, ideals".43
Finally, it should be pointed out that
43C. B resciani-T urroni, E in fu h ru n g in D ie W irtsthe neoliberals, with their love of formalism and symmetrical structures, must be broken hearted that they did not discover the mo mentous classification proposed by Di Fenizio: micropolicy, which would investigate normative models for consumers and produ cers, and macropolicy which would consider normative models for the State.44
In the tropical jungle of economic policy textbooks and manuals through which we are making our painful progress, the trees are not all of the same variety. Each grows into its own shape with its distinctive branch formation and corrugations. Trees grow to wards the light, competing with many other kinds of vegetable life. Without the sun's light they atrophy; but not before trying to send up shoots through any promising open ing. We should therefore not be surprised that each author is somewhat different from his fellows. Each stands apart and yet blends with the rest. Every work differs from the others by some singularity of growth or shape. It is not necessary to study every tree and bush in the forest: that would be impos sible and tremendously monotonous; but it is worth giving some examples. For this purpose let us return to the work of Professor Torres, the author of two shrubs, as it were, in this great jungle.45
After repeating Robbins' argument, Torres offers the following variation: "Al though it may appear paradoxical, econo mists working in the public sector have a better chance of using their science with precision than those working in private enterprise". For Torres, the possibility of analysing and applying economic policy is c h a fts P o litik, B ern, 1948, p. 30 . Q uoted by Seraphim in P olítica económ ica general, op. cit., p. 33. 44 F . di F enizio, E l m étodo de la econom ía política y de la p o lítica económ ica. Barcelona, Bosch Casa E dito rial, 1961. Professor D i F en izio holds th e chair of political econom y in th e L. Bocconi C om m ercial U ni versity, M ilan.
45M. d e T orres, Teoría y práctica en la política económ ica, op. cit., and " Introduction" in R. W alker, D e la teoría económ ica a la política económ ica, op. cit.
White House or the Pentagon-also stems from his particular analytical approach. Prob lems of choice are his daily bread. In any case, his viewpoints should define problems and find solutions in terms which clearly indicate to the person taking the decisions how to attain an objective at a minimum c o st.."51 (Another Robbinsian!) "The elevation of the role of the political economist has also been due to growing professional consensus. It is true that the strident voices of minority groups, the tough discussions of social objectives and the differences in the choice of instruments may obsciire his work from time to time. The chief functions of the economic adviser, as I have seen and known them, are to analyse, interpret and foresee, give political advice, educate, adapt and decipher. Luckily for him politics and economics are more often in harmony than in conflict. For him, happiness lies in the fact that a political necessity may be complemented by means of an economic good."52
There are economists who are proud of their contribution to economic policy. With out taking this analysis any further, let us hear what Meynaud has to say: "Like all other specialists, the economist contributes directly or indirectly to the formation of ideologies... In addition, it is a commonplace that the authorities of all classes tend to turn to specialists who profess an ideology analo gous to their own and, therefore, favourable to their planned projects. Thus in many cases it is in fact difficult to separate an opinion on instruments from an appraisal of objec tives".53 In order to avoid attributing this observation to a political scientist, let us hear what a wholly impartial economist, Profes sor Smithies of Harvard University has to say: "In selecting an adviser, the President should make sure that his adviser's views on policy will correspond generally with his own. But he is unlikely to receive much usable advice if the adviser is unwilling to commit himself on policy issues".54
The enthusiasm of Torres and Heller L quite genuine; they apparently confuse the success of their careers as economists with the economist's contribution to economic policy -an insignificant and almost im perceptible error of judgement. 54A. Sm ithies, "E conom ie w elfare and policy", in E co n o m ies a n d Public Policy, W ashington, T h e Brook ings In stitution, 1955, p. 4. appeared in 1960) and therefore covers a series of ramifications of the discussion on this question, and secondly because it is a didactic text about which the author has two grounds for being pleased with himself; firstly, because of the clarity with which his arguments are presented, and secondly be cause of the moving sincerity with which he sets out straightforwardly and without hesi tation to analyse questions on which pru dence has counselled discretion to other authors of the same stamp.
Ill

And Back to Form alism -a V icious Circle
In his book Di Fenizio summarizes the results of his reflections in a chart which we take the liberty of reproducing here: A *ty p ic a l' p ro ced u re in 'econ om ics ', Here is what the author has to say about his diagram: "A wideranging analysis of the various stages of scientific method in physics and biology has enabled us to establish the different stages of the method both of politi cal economy (a positive science) and of economic policy (a normative science). Since we know the relations between the two branches (positive and normative) of economics, it will be desirable to have a single overall method of investigation which will typically refer to these two branches of learnings. Let us suppose that some superfi cial economic observations of reality produ ce in the researcher a state of insatisfaction at the heart of which lie his own value judge ments; then he will have a problem to study, and using some values as a principle of choice, he will be engaged in positive economics. Thus, he will develop models of political economy and formulate economic laws; he may pursue his research without abandoning the field of economic science; he will adopt some values as ends to be attained; he will use the established models and laws for the purpose of determining the proper means to attain those ends; and finally he will suggest the rules which he considers suited to the proposed ends. In this way his work will be completed and it will be found that the two branches of economic science -positive and norma tive-constitute a higly compact whole" . This is a marvellous circuit handled by the magus-economist: laws and models, from what is to what should be, from ends to laws, from laws to ends, just as the person in charge of the process of scientific creation instructs his student, society. In the first place, it should be noted that in the above quotations it is easy to see the influence 55F . D i F enizio, El m étodo de la econom ía política y de la política económ ica, pp. 363 and 364. m Ib id ., p. 354. of Comtian positivism whose historical origin -early nineteenth century capital ism-was the same as that of neo-classicism. The six volumes of the C ours de ph iloso p h ie p o s itiv e were published between 1830 and 1842. The first edition of Nassau Se nior's A n O u tlin e o f th e Science o f P olitical E co n o m y appeared in 1836 and the second in 1850. The voluminous work of Compte and Littré coincides with that of the Vienna School. Stuart Mill, a militant positivist, argued that psychic facts were elementary states to whose union a substantial nature is attributed, and that there is no need to investigate the grounds of that substance because the observer should stick exclusive ly to relations between primary mental states and the formulation of the relevant laws. The contribution to the construction of neoclassicism is immediately apparent. In addi tion, the academic success of both move ments is identical from the standpoint of their duration and susceptibility to partial changes, and has continued to the present day. Proof of the longevity and adaptability of 'changing everything without changing anything' is the enormous audience today for works such as those of Di Fenizio.
The analysis of the vestiges of Comtian positivism to be found in Di Fenizio's work and the complexity of his thought help to explain a very frequent and recurrent ap proach to the concept of economic policy. Above all, there is a permanent and almost ritualistic effort to establish economics, as knowledge, in the Comtian sense, as a positive science. The economic textbooks repeat this a d n auseam , taking up an appre ciable amount of the reader's time in proving that economics is indeed a science.57 The Comtian curse of the 'trial by ordeal' of 57T h is can b e d one in m any ways. For exam ple, th e re is a ch aracteristic assertion in th e introductory textbook o f J. R. H icks an d A. G. H art, Structure o f th e E conom y: in tro d u ctio n to th e stu d y o f national incom e, " E co n o m ics-th e subject w e are going to study in this book an d in others w hich it is hoped w ill one d ay follow -is a science, one o f th e branches of that great system atic study o f th e w orld in w hich w e live knowledge according to the law of the three stages of knowledge (theological, metaphy sical and positive) calls for this demonstra tion from the 'official' economist. In ad dition, as a better proof of the coming-of-age of his science, he repeats ad nauseam the same old song about equilibria. Using a circular proof, the neo-classical theory is definitive, and since it is the proof that economics is in the positive stage (which in positivism is definitive) it therefore serves a d in fin itu m as a permanent demonstration of its 'positive scientific nature'.
Di Fenizio states that: "Economics sets out to say something about reality as it is: accessible to perception, open to our aware* ness".5fl Political economy, then, is a science which belongs to the empirical rather than to the formal group (logics and mathematics). Again, Di Fenizio explains his ambition: "political economy attempts to say some thing about the existing world and more concretely to explain and predict events, in order to master them (the ultimate goal of the empirical sciences)".59 The thirst for legitimation as a science also effects eco nomic policy. Whether immediately acces sible or the object of scholarly reflection, a theory of economic policy exists or will exist. In what does it differ from political economy? Answer; in that it is normative. Let us listen once again to Di Fenizio: "Since economic policy does not aim to verify what exists but rather to encourage the an d in w h ich w e w rite Science w ith a capital S" . T his is th e first sen ten ce in a textbook w hich a aspires to b e in g th e firs t After stating that econom ics is the scien ce w hich deals w ith com m ercial m atters (ex c h an g e an d distribution) (page 12j th e authors show signs of professional prid e (page 13) w hen stating th a t econom ics attem pts to study these activities scien tifically; in fact, in th e application o f scientific m ethods to th e study o f hum an b ehaviour it has achieved greater progress than th e other social sciences. T hey draw atten tio n to th e sim ilarity w ith th e oth er sciences: the m eth o d o f investigation in m o d em economics is the sam e as in all sciences.
58F. D i F enizio, E l m étodo de la econom ía política y de la p o lítica económ ica, p. 17. 59Ib id., p. 18. attainment of something which is consid ered 'good', just', 'viable' or some such thing, it is not a positive but rather a normative science. That is to say, it does not restrict itself to accepting values as chosen elements in its field of research, as criteria of choice, but accepts them as the focal point of the norms and precepts which it wishes to have adopted or which, at least, it proposes."60 Something must be said about the meaning of the ultimate goal of empirical science: mastery. "This dominion of science over reality is a complex matter. It may even be aesthetic or intellectual, and does not only mean, as many people believe, the possibility of modifying events.This mastery is different from the programme of normative science which has another goal: "This is called economic policy, which either attempts, by using the laws and models established by political economics, to lay down rules about how the unit of consumption or the unit of production, for example, should behave if it is desired to attain certain ends (micropolicy) or else is aimed at establishing precepts (norms, advice concerning what should be) about how power groups should behave when, within the framework of the economic system in question, other specific ends are desired (macropolicy or economic policy, as it is currently called The economist as sage -positive scien tist-lays down rules and precepts (natural ly based on value judgements) for the micro units and the groups which possess power. What does he base himself upon? Answer: science. "Broadly speaking, all research in economic policy takes the form first of an analysis of the relations existing between the different economic ends proposed by the policy; then, and this is the most obvious aspect of the research, in indicating the means suited to attaining those ends."64 "...in order to do so, it makes use of the laws and models prepared by political economics as a positive science. In proposing means to attain the ends desired by certain power groups, it makes use precisely of the uni formities offered by the economists."65 Secondly, it is worth emphasizing this identification of the economist with the sage. The quotations from Di Fenizio clearly show the aim of the economist handling the theory of economic policy: namely, to lay down rules and propose precepts based on serious positive scientific knowledge; and the position he aims to occupy in the social hierarchy: to advise, with the dignity and serenity bestowed by his white hairs -to ®A. Sm ithies, " Econom ic w elfare an d policy", op, cit., p. advise consumers, the owners of the units of production, and the groups which possess power. This role of the sage is part of the scientific ethic of Comtian positivism. In its early stages positivism was a doctrine of peaceful social reform: reflecting the 'new broom1 approach which the new dominant capitalist groups in their quiet moments (early nineteenth century) wished to adopt with regard to the vestiges of the former régime, the positivist ideology predicated as a moral doctrine a norm for society and rules by which men should live their lives. In politics it stuck to the age-old doctrine of natural law. As a functional doctrine of knowledge in relation to society, it was based on a doctrine of knowledge, from which stemmed the norm for society and the rules by which men should live. The positi ve stage is not merely a form and stage of the organization of the sciences, but also what produces a positive stage of society. The development of knowledge will culminate in a point where society will possess a positive sociology ruled by the values of pacifism, order and hierarchy. "Love as a principle, order as a basis and progress as a goal"; and in this hierarchy, spiritual power will belong to the sages and temporal power to the industrialists. In this positive stage of economic science, the economist is raised to the position of sage; the neo-classicist recei ves his due share of spiritual power. Hence the importance of equilibria for the econo mist -as his credential for power. It is likewise easy to understand the benevolent and doctoral tone of a theory of economic policy. The exact semantic mean ing of the expression -so frequently used-'ends of economic policy' becomes clear. End is not synonymous with objective; and end is what is advised by the venerable and benevolent greybeard. An end is what should be, the norm. An economic objective is in a different category. Let us turn once again to Di Fenizio for enlightenment: "Economic action is not a science as a generalizing branch of knowledge. It is an activity carried out by the government of a specific community or by large economic groups which possess power in order to attain specific practical purposes, using for that purpose both the laws of political economics and the precepts of economic policy" .66
In peaceful times the sage's position is peaceful. From the confines of his chair of 'official economics' he advises, with his spiritual power, those who hold temporal power. At times of unrest the picture is quite different: 'official economics' loses its bear ings, and may opt for a pragmatic, opera tional approach, climb down from its official chair, roll up its sleeves, shout its praises and invent technical jargon; in so doing, however, it undergoes a 'crisis of academic dignity' -how regrettable that the grey beard should turn to economic action. The other possibility is to turn to the absurd, where the extreme position is that of our old acquaintance Professor Seraphim. (Besides, the tradition of the absurd has its precedent in the evolution of Comtian positivism itself: the cult of Clothilde de Vaux, the religion of humanity past, present and future, as the Supreme Being, etc.; the idealistic critique of the religion of initial positivism trans formed into a secularized religion by posi tivism at an advanced stage. We have enough evidence that economics can also become a cult object.) In the twentieth century we see 'official economics' divided into these two streams, with obvious consequences as concerns their conception of economic policy.67 However, we shall not deal with this question for the time being.
Thirdly, it should be remembered that m lb id ., p. 363. 67C o m m en tin g o n Professor Sam uelson's p resid en tial ad d ress to th e A m erican Econom ic Association in 1961, Seligm an said " (Sam uelson) argued that there w as a dichotom y b etw een th e in n er logic of th e science a n d its im plications for th e man in th e street, a dichotom y w hich he seem ed to w elcom e. In fact, the good political econom ist was apt to be an indifferent analyst an d th e good analyst really d id not have to b o th e r about th e state of th e w orld" . B. B. Seligman, op. cit., p. 433. positivism is a theory of knowledge which refuses to recognize any reality which is not factual, and refuses to investigate anything other than the relationship between facts. It accepts facts as the empirical meaning of the affirmation of existence. Facts as objects of positive knowledge exist only through the reports of the senses. The scientist's task is therefore to grasp facts at the level at which they exist, as they appear -at the level of appearance-and articulate their relations.
Thus positivism aims to stick to what is known from the senses and never go beyond what is so given. The rejection of all a priori knowledge, of direct intuition of the intelli gible and of deductive method, and the reduction of philosophy to the results of science, etc., may be derived from the postulates of positivism in its quiet mo ments. In troubled times, in the form of logical positivism, some of these distinctive features are forgotten and, using different kinds of sleight of hand, it will adopt some of the procedures which in its tranquil periods it condemned as pre-scientific.68 However, let us return to its initial stage. It is not for the scientist to answer the questions what, why or wherefore (for which he would have to resort to metaphysics or even theology), but rather to explain how interfactual relation ships are articulated. Professor Popper states that: "We are not interested in questions such as what is energy? what is movement? or what is the atom? On the contrary, modem physics puts forward questions such as how can solar energy be used?, how does a planet move? ... and to the philosophers ... who unfortunately cannot give precise answers to questions which begin with a 'why?', with-I t is ra th e r typical th atT . W. H utchison, the first to in tro d u ce th e verification criterion of logical positivism in econom ics, p u b lish e d his book en titled The S ig n ifi cance a n d B asic P ostulates o f E conom ic Theory in 1938, th e year in w hich th ere was th e greatest d isen c h an tm en t w ith econom ics and th e international set ting. T h is discussion has c o n tin u ed to our days: Machlup, F ried m an , Koopmans, Rotw ein, G ordon, Schoeffler, B uttrick, etc., are som e o f those who have taken part in this arg u m en t a b o u t logical positivism in economics. out first having answered the questions formulated with a 'what?', the scientist will reply that he prefers the modest degree of exactness to which he can aspire with his methods to the presumptuous confusion they achieve with theirs."69 This position favours analysis and rejects criticism, since reality, on the plane of appearance, always appears fragmented.
Economics as a form of analysis which gives preference to certain phenomena, which seeks their relationships by formu lating hypotheses and verifying them, and systematizing those hypotheses in the form of co-ordinated theories (or models); econo mics as the empirical analysis of apparent data: this is the level which it is hoped to reach in the more naive versions of neo-clas sicism.™ (There still remains that thorny problem of verifying the hypotheses!)71
Finally, one of the constants of positiv ism in its many and successive versions (and of neo-classicism in its later editions), and also its corollary, is the 'historiophobic' standpoint. History is only accepted as a mere chronicle because "by its nature it singles out what is individual, unique, par ticular".72 Historiophobia rejects out of hand any and every position which, to use its own terms, turns "sociology into theoretical his tory",73 classifying as 'historicist' positions fflK. P opper, The O pen Society and its Enem ies, P rin ceto n U niversity Press, 1950, p, 62, quoted by Di F en izio , op. cit., p. 26. ™ Our frien d R obbins is a radical apriorist who arg u es th at econom ic theory is a system of deductions on th e basis of a series of assum ptions w hich are not su sc e p tib le o f em pirical verification. T he contrary position w ould be that of th e ultraem piricist who claims th a t he starts from facts and not from assum ptions. 'O fficial econom ics' has oscillated b etw een th ese two extrem es.
71T h ere is a great deal of literature on th e difficul ties an d unsatisfactoriness of th e d eductive construction o f neo-classicism for the verification o f hypotheses and w e recom m end th e in terested read er to consult chapter II, sections 3 to 6, o f A. 
